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Remarks of
SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D-MONT.)
Before the
Senate Committee on Government Operations
January 21, 1976
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee: These hearings
coincide with the concluding days of the Select Committee's investigation into illegal, improper or unethical activities conducted
by the Nation's intelligence community.
As we learn about and begin to understand these revelations it becomes apparent that what the American people knew
before were but dim shadows of our intelligence establishment -shadows which were cast only from time to time.

For most of us

the community itself remains as it had before -- cloaked in mystery.
Heretofore, that was so because Congress largely chose to ignore
it.

It will continue a mystery, however, unless and until Congress

chooses to change its policy and to exert some degree of scrutiny
and vigilence, to perform some measure of oversight, to extract a
commitment of on goin g

accountability.

The excesses of our

intelligence community now so familiar to us all are a direct result
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of Congressional neglect and inattention.
What is to be remembered in the context of these hearings
and any forthcoming recommendations is the essential necessity
for a strong, vital and highly competent intelligence gathering
facility within the Nation.

What is not to be forgotten for a

moment is the outstanding work to date performed by the CIA, the
NSA, the FBI and all of the rest.

That is not to say that there

is no compelling need for vigilence and accountability.

Super-

vision and responsiveness are the only ways we might avoid as
much as possible the recurrence of past strains against our
constitutional system.
The initial question then is whether there is to be any
oversight facility concerning the intelligence community within
the Senate.

That question for me personally does not need

extensive comment.

Even without recent investigations it was

clear that Congressional awareness of intelligence activities
been inadequa te.

had

Either unable, unwilling, ill-e quipped or othe r-
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wise, the Senate certainly has not performed this essential
function.

It could be said that we as elected representatives

under this form of government simply have not performed as we
should have performed.

We have been inexcusably lax.

not the time, nor is this the place to assess blame,

Now is
~~-~~~~~~'

to

cite responsibility or to lay bare these deficiencies of the past.
Nor indeed was it the Senate alone that failed.

But the failure

is there nonetheless, cumulatively but unmistakedly.

It is there

in terms of the abuse, in terms of the waste and inefficiency,
in terms of outright assaults against freedom and individual
liberty.
Intelligence is necessary.
right and appropriate.
Committee.

It is necessary, essential,

But neither is that an issue before this

In the past in America the intelligence function has

been a cornerstone to national survival, manned, 1n my judgment,
by the most competent, effective and dedicated individuals ever
assembled.

In the context of the world as it is and as it will no

-4doubt continue, intelligence gathering will remain a vital support
to the Nation.

No one seriously questions that proposition.

What

you are here considering, Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee,
is oversight, or awareness, or watchfulness, all reflecting the
appropriate role of the legislative body within the framework of
American democracy.

To be sure, there will be cries of meddling,

of wrongful intrusion, of so-called "politics."

Already they are

heard - in the corridors outside and even in the press.

But be

steadfast, I suggest, Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee.
Be steadfast in your efforts to recommend to the Senate a facility
that will provide regular, comprehensive and systematic oversight
regarding the Nation's intelligence function.
heard before and they prevailed.

Those cries were

They served to obstruct the role

of this institution only to misdirect it or mislead it at times
in pursuit of ill-advised and misguided policies both at home and
abroad.
As you know, my own efforts to create a more consistent

-5and comprehensive approach to intelligence oversight by the
Senate goes back more than a decade.

The reasons for my past

concern, may I say, have been amply justified recently in terms
of the task undertaken this past year by the Church-Tower Committee.
Those reasons are diverse -- as diverse as intelligence operations
themselves; operations which are scattered among and between a
dozen or more agencies, bureaus and departments.

CIA, as this

Committee knows, undertakes only a fragment of the total intelligence activities of the United States Government.

There is NSA,

DIA, the Bureau of Intelligence within the State Department,
Treasury's Office of National Security, ERDA, the Air Force
intelligence unit, G-2 in the

t~

Army/ ~

Marine Corps, Naval intelli-

gence and then the dozen or so agencies that cover domestic
intelligence including FBI, DEA, IRS and so forth.

Within this

intelligence thicket have arisen unneeded overlaps and duplication of effort, g oals and achievements.

To reshuffle and

restructure them will take more than the immediate task this

-6Committee assumes.
however.

They do explain a small aspect of the problem,

The history of effective coordination is as uneven as

the history of the growth of the intelligence community itself
and the changing cast of officials within the differing lines of
authority charged with administering it.
Then too, there is the question of federal agencies
directing actions against individual

u. s.

citizens in clear

violation of the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution.
This is only another aspect of the problem.

But it should also

be open to some form of Senate scrutiny.
And in connection with overlap and duplication, what
about the effective use of intelligence reports?

Within the

various components of the intelligence community there often have
existed differing conclusions about a given set of facts or events.
In helping to formulate national policy should we in the Senate
not have the benefit of the various reactions within the intelligence community to a problem facing the Nation?

Admittedly, global

-7conflict at times seems to pounce on us as a Nation but the
lesson of Vietnam stands also as a reminder of an information
and assessment hiatus that in my judgment assisted the misdirection, misapplication and imprudent commitment of U. S. resources
and manpower.

By the same token, let us remember that Angola

stands immediately before us with the Middle East as always on
the horizon.
Delicate indeed does this become when we speak of covert
actions employed to influence events.
be abandoned.

It is not that they should

It is rather that their purposes be measured with

more care than previously demanded against the vital interests of
the United States.

It means too that effective awareness of them be

extended to this institution.
Beyond these issues there is the question of fitting
together the Nation's intelligence components from the standpoint
of external threats vis-a-vis actions occurring within our
national boundaries which tend to serve them or to aid or assist
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them.

Such an oversight mandate must, therefore, include the

capacity to accommodate an integrated perception of national
intelligence - not foreign intelligence, not domestic intelligence -but national intelligence.
Certainly, there are additional issues that would justify
an intelligence oversight function or mandate by the Senate.

But,

as I perceive the task of your Committee, Mr. Chairman, with the
rationale already there, the endeavor now is to design a Senate
facility capable of doing the job while at the same time safeguarding the most vital secrets of the Nation -- and by that I
mean matters the exposure of which would threaten our very survival.
How do I see such a facility?
Its form?

Its shape?

Its function?

In part I have explained it already, but I would like

to make some further comments.
First of all, should it be a Senate facility?
have indicated that.
I believe.

Yes.

I

It was first proposed twenty-one years ago,

What the House does is up to the House.

It has under-
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t a ken its own special intelligence investigation this past year
and may arrive at differing conclusions on where to go from here
in the context of its own constitutional responsibility.

But, in

my mind, it is clear from the Constitution, from the laws and the
history of this Nation that the Senate is assigned a unique and
special role in foreign affairs.

To more effectively perform

that role in behalf of the American people the Senate must create
every agency and facility needed to do the job.
oversight is needed.

Intelligence

To do that job, a facility must be created.

As a body the full Senate cannot do it and to date no
existing committees have done it.

As a result, in my own exper-

ience over the years, I along with the Senate have suffered a
significant deficiency both as to the awareness of the intelligence
apparatus and operation and the information gathered and assessed
therein.
What about the charter?

I think it should be sufficiently

broad to encompass all major intelligence organizations.

Directly

-10under it, therefore, should at least come the activities of CIA,
NSA, DSA, certain endeavors of DOD and the counterintelligence
undertakings of the FBI.

While it thus should be broad enough to

invite the most generous scrutiny of the intelligence community
in the Senate's behalf, it need not limit or preclude the normal
delegated jurisdictional bases of other standing committees.

In

some cases, in fact, there is a great deal to be said for a little
competition.

But no committee, no agency of the Senate has

exercised complete vigilence over such obvious questions, for
example, as intelligence coordination.

No committee heretofore

has analyzed on a continuing basis the ongoing activities of each
of the intelligence components, related their · activities to each
other or fitted them together into an integrated whole.

Overlap,

duplication, swollen and inefficient budgets and so forth may or
may not be in the interests of this Nation.

Only by vigilence and

understanding, however, can such judgments be made.
And what about the issue of unconstitutional operations
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against citizens of the United States by an intelligence appartus.
For these, there have existed few, if any, remedies in the past.
What remedies there have been were inadequate at best.

Oversight

coupled with a mechanism that assures accountability would go far
in my judgment to preserve notions of individual liberty that we
cherish so deeply.
Of particular sensitivity is the question of budget
analysis with respect to intelligence operations.

But oversight

per se would seem to dictate that such a function be included
within any mandate established.

In the past we have been put off

in this area with urgings that there have been no hearings, no
investigations and so forth.

The investigations have occurred,

hearings have been held and it is time I think that we carve out
a rational way to perform a simple authorizing function on an
annual basis.
accountability.

Such a function is essential to the question of
Perhaps a line-item approach would not be in

order granting the nature of many of the activities involved but

-12aggregate sums certainly reveal little,if any,of our intelligence
story that is not already known to the world.

As I recall,

atomic and nuclear expenditures are handled in similar fashion.
Beyond an annual authorization, however, such a committee
must be kept informed on a continuing basis of all major activities
and plans.

Overall, it must be equipped with appropriate tools

to assure such responsiveness.

But while subpoenas, compliance

and contempt procedures and the like should be made available -the emphasis in this area must be on cooperation with the Executive
and that too should be spelled out in any charter along with appropriate measures to require that cooperation be a two-way street.
It seems to me that a primary concern here is to assure
that national policy formulated largely by and within the legislative branch is not to be overturned, undercut or frustrated in
its execution and implementation.

The initial burden of coming

forward by necessity would fall on the agency or agencies involved
and in turn it would be the responsibility of the Committee as the
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Senate's agent to keep the Senate advised in an appropriate manner
keeping in mind the relative importance and sensitivity of whatever issue happens to be at stake.

Standards and safeguards

regarding disclosure may be in order but it has always been my
conviction that Senators are equal, that there are no super
Senators, that no member elected to serve in this institution
exceeds any other in terms of patriotism, of leyalty or of dedication to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the laws
of the United States.

It is, 1n fact, for this reason that I

believe that the membership on the Intelligence Committee should
be rotated.

A limitation of six or eight years of consecutive

service on the Committee would guarantee the vigil.nt inquiry
that a fresh mind brings to any problem.

It would avoid the

possible danger of establishing the client relationship that
+~
could otherwise ~so easily occur~e~Also, it would provide in time

a significant foundation upon which the Senate as a whole might
confidently adjudge the recommendations of its agent -- the

-14Committee.
Otherwise, I would apply the same standards as are
imposed upon the other standing committees in terms of composition,
selection, membership, staffing, the election of Chairman, and
whatnot save only that the sensitive nature of its tasks requires
that additional precautions be taken just as they are by the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy and just as they have been this past
year by the Select Intelligence Committee.
One final comment, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee.

While these views reflect and expand upon my public

critique of the work and recommendations of the Commission on the
Organization of the Government -- the so-called Murphy Commission -with respect to the establishment of an intelligence committee,
I would caution you and this Committee concerning an aspect of
this issue insofar as the involv ement of Congress and the Senate
is concerned.

I served on that Commission and my views on its

performance are rather well known.

What I wish to say is that

-15there is some risk in creating any committee in this area.

What

I would not want to see happen; indeed, what would be counterproductive would be a committee cloaked only with apparent importance, manned by some elite few who gained admission outside the
normal selection process, centralized and aloof, and in the end so
impotent that it would itself become a creature if not an active
conspirator within the community over which it must exert scrutiny.
Make it independent.
independence.

Give it the tools and power to protect that

And above all, make certain that it responds to

the Senate and to the Senate alone.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.

